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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note was not originally about Equifax. I decided to write a Note about
Data Breach Litigation during my 1L summer internship, after working on the
early stages of a putative class action lawsuit against a healthcare provider. The
breach involved compromising the personally identifiable information (PII)—
including sensitive medical information—of as many as 531,000 people. At the
time, I thought that was a lot.
The project ended up occupying a fair amount of my time that summer, and
by the time classes started back I thought I had something of a pet theory for
stating a common law claim for negligent data security. This Note will make the
case for that theory.
Then Equifax. In early September, news broke that Equifax had been the
victim of one of the largest data breaches ever recorded.1 The breach, Equifax
told us, compromised the personally identifiable information of as many as 143
million Americans—nearly half the adult population of the United States.2
Perhaps most striking was CNN’s report that
[u]nlike other data breaches, not all of the people affected by the Equifax
breach may be aware that they’re customers of the company. Equifax gets its
data from credit card companies, banks, retailers, and lenders who report on the
credit activity of individuals to credit reporting agencies, as well as by purchasing
public records.3
It wasn’t long before I would tell a classmate, a professor, or a friend about
my Note topic, and they would reply, “Oh cool, so you’re writing about
Equifax?” And so it was—my Note was swept up in the breach. Fine. I guess
I’m writing about Equifax.
But, in reality, there is more than that at stake here. What I fear will escape
notice is that, depending on who you ask, Equifax isn’t even the largest recorded
data breach,4 and it certainly wasn’t the only one this year. Said another way, this
was not a one-off event. Years before the Equifax breach, data from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services noted 1,059 breaches impacting

1 Sarah Ashely O’Brien, Giant Equifax data breach: 143 million people could be affected, (Sept. 8,
2017, 9:23 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/07/technology/business/equifax-data-breach/index.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Mark Fahey, Yahoo data breach is among the biggest in history (Sept. 22, 2016, 3:09 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/22/yahoo-data-breach-is-among-the-biggest-inhistory.html.
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close to 32 million individuals.5 In 2017 alone, Yahoo, Uber, Verizon, and
NetProspex all suffered breaches affecting no less than 14 million people—
each.6
Even before news of the Equifax Breach broke, data security concerns were
becoming more common and more pressing. “In the course of our everyday
activities, we routinely reveal our names, addresses, and social security numbers
as well as our financial decisions, health problems, tastes, habits, political and
religious affiliations, sexual orientation, hobbies, and love affairs.”7 Some such
transactions are unavoidable, like healthcare, insurance, employment and
taxation, and even benefits and entitlements. The frightening reality is that once
the information is conveyed, one loses the ability to ensure its security.
Certainly, steps can be taken to protect oneself against identity theft and
related harm—but no system is foolproof. Moreover, even to the extent such
harm can be remedied, it is not difficult to imagine contexts in which a credit
freeze or similar circumstances can cause meaningful harm by hobbling a
person’s ability to make large scale and important purchases. The more
immediate impact, however, is seen in the estimated $4.1 billion consumers
would end up paying to freeze their credit.8
The other side of the data-breach coin is that commercial entities collecting
and storing large quantities of PII face a constant threat of criminal hacking to
steal and sell customer PII on the black market.9 Estimates placed Equifax’s
losses from the breach between $200 and $300 million by Christmas 2017.10
Moreover, it is virtually impossible to monetarily gauge what is, without a doubt,
an unprecedented loss of consumer confidence in corporate information
storage.11
Where there is a loss, there is a lawsuit. On September 11th, 2017, less than
a week after the breach was announced, Reuters reported that more than thirty
lawsuits had already been filed.12 It appears that dozens more were filed in

5 Eduard Goodman, The Equifax Data Breach And Its Impact On Businesses (Sept. 14, 2017,
2:36PM),https://www.law360.com/articles/963870/the-equifax-data-breach-and-its-impacton-businesses.
6 Robin Kurzer, Equifax and beyond: How data breaches shaped 2017 (Dec, 21, 2017, 10:30 AM),
https://marketingland.com/equifax-beyond-data-breaches-shaped-2017-230569.
7 Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 381 (2003).
8 Kurzer, supra note 6.
9 See generally Monique C.M. Leahy, Litigation of Data Breach, 140 Am. Jur. Trials 327 § 1,
Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018).
10 Kurzer, supra note 6.
11 Id.
12 Reuters Staff, Lawsuits against Equifax pile up after massive data breach (Sept. 11, 2017, 2:52
PM),https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-cyber-lawsuits/lawsuits-against-equifaxpile-up-after-massive-data-breach-idUSKCN1BM2E3.
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subsequent weeks,13 but exact numbers are difficult to estimate amid
consolidations, venue changes, voluntary dismissals, and suits against Equifax
unrelated to the breach. Most of these are still in the early stages as this Note is
being revised in early January 2018. These include individuals, financial
institutions,14 and even the City of San Francisco.15
While most states have statutes that require consumer notification of a data
breach,16 many do not yet have statutes directly governing data security
practices.17 In the absence of an overarching framework, the problem that
presents itself is that a multi and cross-jurisdictional problem is treated in vastly
different ways, and sometimes not addressed at all. This uncertainty creates
numerous problems in a commercial world based more and more on the
collection, sale, and storage of PII.
For one thing, victims of PII theft due to negligent security are often left
largely without remedy.18 Credit monitoring is generally “the universal ‘band aid’
offered to consumers,”19 but it is by no means a complete solution. For one
thing, credit monitoring only detects credit fraud—not the scores of other
vehicles for fraud using PII—and it lasts for a finite amount of time.20 As one
senior industry analyst put it, “[b]ad guys can be very patient, so it’s important to
keep an eye out long after this story fades from the headlines.”21
Conversely, holders of PII can face tremendous uncertainty with respect to
their responsibility to safeguard information across jurisdictions, even in
neighboring states.22 The nature and scope of statutory duties differ, in turn

13 Renae Merle, After the breach, Equifax now faces the lawsuits (Sept. 22, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/09/22/after-the-breach-equifax-nowfaces-the-lawsuits/?utm_term=.07345eb72908
14 See id.
15 CBS News, Equifax hit with first lawsuit by U.S. city over data breach (Sept. 26, 2017, 3:29 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/equifax-data-breach-lawsuit-by-us-city/.
16 2018 Security Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27,
2018),http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology
/2018-Security-breach-legislation.aspx.
17 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2017, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 29,
2017),http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
cybersecurity-legislation-2017.aspx.
18 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 7 (asserting that a lack of demonstrable injury often limits the
ability of plaintiffs to bring suit).
19 Litigation of Data Breach supra note 9, § 7 Harm or injury required: credit monitoring.
20 See, e.g., Robert Harrow, What For-Pay Credit Monitoring Services Actually Offer, FORBES (Sept.
25, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertharrow/2017/09/25/what-forpay-credit-monitoring-services-actually-offer/ (discussing features of credit monitoring).
21 O’Brien, supra note 1.
22 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 3 (demonstrating the patchwork nature of state statutes
governing data breaches).
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requiring complicated compliance regimes.23 Even before the Equifax breach,
the “patchwork” of federal and state laws and regulations governing data security
was “generating more interest than ever” as businesses that store consumer
information wondered “how these developments should impact their data
security practices.”24
This note argues that litigants and courts should conceptualize a duty to
safeguard PII under a bailment theory. Despite the relative novelty of the factual
scenario, recognizing such a duty is simply a question of applying firmly
established common law principles. The first such principle is the intangible
property rights a person holds with respect to their PII. By definition, such
information is specific to the individual and is widely recognized as being for the
beneficial use of that individual as a participant in society. Next, although PII is
not a tangible “thing,” and certainly not a single “thing,” the trust involved in
giving it over to another party in order to facilitate the exchange of money for
goods or services is reminiscent of a common law bailment for mutual benefit.
Finally, age old principles of property law establish a duty of reasonable care with
respect to the object—the breach of which gives rise to a cause of action for
negligent data security.
Part II of this Note will discuss the background of data security litigation,
including state and federal statutory duties, the gaps and problems associated
with inconsistent treatment among these authorities, and the common law
principles involved in asserting a duty to safeguard. Part III of this Note will
analyze the rights individuals have in their personally identifiable information and
the dynamics of the commercial bailment relationship created by the exchange
of PII. Part IV will conclude by arguing that courts and litigants should
conceptualize the standard cause of action for negligent data security under a
quasi-bailment theory.
II. BACKGROUND
Relatively speaking, litigation of data breaches as such is still in its infancy.
Thus,
[d]espite this groundswell of potential claimants, there is no
single set of laws setting forth the legal duty of care or the bases
for civil liability in data breach settings. Consequently, aggrieved

23 See id. (“The applicability of state and federal statutes depends on such factors as the type
of data, where the data is stored, how it is stored, and who stores it. As a result, data security
practices may be subject to distinct but overlapping statutory requirements.”).
24 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 3 (quoting Rosenfeld & McDowell, Moving Target: Protecting
Against Data Breaches Now and Down the Road, 28-SUM Antitrust 90 (2014)).
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individuals and their attorneys have been forced to resort to a
patchwork of common law and state or federal statutory claims.25
A. THE TYPICAL CAUSES OF ACTION

The resulting “patchwork” has worked itself out such that, at present, data
breach litigation takes place on one of four planes:
I.
II.
III.
IV.

Shareholder derivative lawsuits,
Securities fraud class actions,
Enforcement actions by governmental agencies, and
Class action lawsuits by breached companies’ customers or business
partners.26

1. Shareholder Derivative Suits. Shareholder derivative actions appear in the
cybersecurity/data breach context through allegations that management failed to
take adequate precautions to guard against a data breach.27 Shareholders
pursuing these sorts of derivative actions face numerous challenges, including
the requirement that they first make a demand on the corporation to file suit,
and the judicial presumption that the decision not to do so was reasonable and
made in good faith.28 For example, Target shareholders saw their consolidated
derivative suits find such an end in March 2016, after the company’s appointed
special litigation committee (SLC) concluded that it would not be in Target’s best
interest to pursue claims against the named officers and directors.29 The
shareholders stipulated to dismissal of the case in accordance with the SLC’s
guidelines in exchange for the right to seek attorney’s fees.30
2. Securities Fraud Class Actions. Securities fraud class-action lawsuits have also
served as a tool to recover for diminution in stock values following a cyberbreach.31 In this context, shareholders might claim that they relied to their
detriment on a company’s material misrepresentations regarding data privacy or
security and readiness, usually made in public statements, press releases, or the
25 Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You’ve Been Hacked, and Now You’re Being Sued: The Developing
World of Cybersecurity Litigation, 90 FLA. BAR J., July/August 2016 30, 31.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 31–32.
28 See, e.g., Palkon v. Holmes, 2014 WL 5341880 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014) (dismissing a
derivative suit filed against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation involving the theft of over
619,000 payment card numbers, finding the board’s decision to reject the shareholder’s
demand to sue under the business judgement rule’s presumption).
29 Ronald W. Breaux et al., Target Data Breach Derivative Suit Dismissed, HAYNES BOONE (July
19,2016), http://www.haynesboone.com/alerts/target-data-breach-derivative-suit-dismissed.
30 Id.
31 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25.
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corporation’s Form 10-K reports.32 Damages in this context manifest as a
reduction in stock value, usually with the requirement by courts that there be a
“statistically significant” decline in stock price.33 In one of the earliest data
breach lawsuits filed, plaintiff shareholders sued Heartland Payment Systems,
Inc. in 2007 regarding a data breach impacting 130 million credit and debit card
numbers.34 Although Heartland’s stock price fell almost eighty percent, and the
plaintiffs alleged that the company had hidden the attack on its network and
overstated its preparedness, the court dismissed the lawsuit.35 The court held
that Heartland’s failure to disclose the prior cyber-attack was not a material
omission, and the mere fact that the system had been infiltrated before did not
necessarily mean the referenced public statements were false.36
3. Governmental Enforcement Actions. Federal agencies have also “gotten into
the cybersecurity mix.”37 In 2014, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) released a Cybersecurity Framework,38 which is widely
considered to be the leading federal authority for cybersecurity guidance.39
However, the Framework and related guidance are nonbinding, and provide no
enforcement mechanism.40 Thus, several other federal agencies have become
active in litigating data breach issues, including the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).41
These agencies typically rely on statutory and regulatory authority not
intended for data breach litigation. In recent years, the SEC has taken steps
toward pursuing more enforcement actions like regulations containing a

Id. at 32.
See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 10 Civ. 3461 (PAC), 2015 WL 5613150
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Arkansas Teachers Retirement Sys.
v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 879 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that defendants failed to
show a complete lack of price impact due to their inability to show that the decline in stock
price was attributable only to the market reaction to the announcement of enforcement
actions, and not due to the material misrepresentations made).
34 In Re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148, at *1
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2009).
35 Id. at *1, *8.
36 Id. at *7–8.
37 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 37 (noting that these initiatives have encountered “stiff
resistance” due to the absence of overarching federal regulation to regulate cybersecurity, and
the lack of a uniform standard for private-sector cybersecurity).
38 National Institute of Standards & Technology, NIST Releases Cybersecurity Framework
Version 1.0 (Feb. 12, 2014), http://nist.gov/itl/csd/launch-cybersecurity-framework-021214.cfm.
39 See id. (discussing the framework and collaboration throughout the industry); Hooker &
Pill, supra note 25, at 37.
40 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 37–38 (but noting that “some commentators believe the
Framework may create a de facto legal standard that ultimately is applied by the courts”).
41 Id. at 38.
32
33
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“safeguards rule,” requiring covered entities to adopt reasonable procedures for
the protection of client records and information.42
The FTC has been even more active, bringing more than fifty enforcement
proceedings relating to data security in recent years.43 Recently, the FTC has
filed lawsuits in federal court under its authority to prohibit “unfair or deceptive
trade acts or practices in or affecting commerce” under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.44 In F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., for example, the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that differences between Wyndham’s
policies and practices were sufficient to support a claim under the FTCA, holding
that the FTC has authority to regulate “unfair” cybersecurity failures under
§ 45.45 The Court reasoned that the FTCA, along with Wyndham’s prior data
breach issues, provided sufficient notice of pertinent data breach standards.46
4. Consumer Class Actions. Finally, and most relevant to this Note, consumer
class actions have continued to take shape as a form of data-breach litigation.47
As previously noted, these actions have been asserted under statutory claims with
greater and greater frequency.48 Usage of statutory bases for suit have been
numerous and varied, ranging from state statutes on point all the way to older
state and federal statutes addressed toward unrelated subject matter.49 Where
statutory authority is unavailable, or simply unsuccessful, plaintiffs have turned
to a number of common law theories.50
Some federal statutes address themselves toward data privacy and security,
but even the few that codify a duty to safeguard are extremely limited in scope.51
For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions to
protect consumers’ nonpublic personal information, including the prevention of
disclosure to unauthorized third parties.52 However, courts have generally been
unwilling to hold that other entities, like health care providers, meet the statutory
criteria to be a “financial institution.”53 Along the same lines, the Fair Credit
42 See 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2005); R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management, Proceeding No. 316827 (bringing charges against public companies for failure to protect the PII of customers
and clients who were the victims of criminal hacking).
43 Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955,
957–58 (2016).
44 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018).
45 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2015).
46 Id. at 258–59.
47 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 34 (also considering claims by financial institutions doing
business with defendant companies).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 31.
51 Id. at 36.
52 Id.
53 See id.; see also Leahy, supra note 9, § 3 (illustrating the distinction between financial
institutions and health care providers).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/3

8

Skedvold: A Duty to Safeguard: Data Breach Litigation Through a Quasi-Bailm
SKEDSVOLD (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

A DUTY TO SAFEGUARD

10/2/2018 1:43 PM

209

Reporting Act requires consumer reporting agencies to, among other things,
safely dispose of consumer information and maintain reasonable procedures to
avoid its disclosure.54
Interestingly, plaintiffs have also attempted to make use of federal statutes
not aimed directly at data breach.55 Negligence per se claims under HIPAA, for
example, have achieved mixed results. In Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, the
Ohio Court of Appeals held that a negligence per se action under HIPAA “is no
less than a private action to enforce HIPAA, which is precluded.”56 Conversely,
in Smith v. Triad of Ala., the court allowed the plaintiff to pursue a negligence per
se action based on HIPAA based on Alabama case law “indicat[ing] Alabama
courts’ willingness to allow statutes that do not otherwise provide private causes
of action to serve as the basis for a negligence per se claim. . . .”57
At the state level, numerous statutes have been targeted toward the duty to
safeguard PII, for example:
Arkansas
Personal
Information
Protection Act

“A person or business that acquires, owns, or licenses personal information
about an Arkansas resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to
protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure.”58

California

“It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that personal information about
California residents is protected. . . . A business that owns, licenses, or
maintains personal information about a California resident shall implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature
of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”59

Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 36.
See, e.g., Complaint at 25–26, Wexler v. Peachtree Orthopaedic Clinic, No.
2016CV284076 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2016) (alleging negligence per se under § 45 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
56 40 N.E.3d 661, 674 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
57 No. 1:14–CV–324–WKW, 2015 WL 5793318, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2015).
58 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4–110–104(b) (2005).
59 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(a)(i), (b) (West/Deering 2004).
54
55
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“[e]ach covered entity, governmental entity, or third-party agent shall take
reasonable measures to protect and secure data in electronic form containing
personal information.”60

Maryland
Personal
Information
Protection Act

“To protect personal information from unauthorized access, use, modification,
or disclosure, a business that owns or licenses personal information of an
individual residing in the State shall implement and maintain reasonable
security procedures and practices that are appropriate to the nature of the
personal information owned or licensed and the nature and size of the business
and its operations.”61

Maryland State
Government
Laws

A State government unit “that collects personal information of an individual
shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices that
are appropriate to the nature of the personal information collected and the
nature of the unit and its operations [to protect personal information from
unauthorized access, use, modification, or disclosure].”62

Nevada

“A data collector that maintains records which contain personal information of
a resident of this State shall implement and maintain reasonable security
measures to protect those records from unauthorized access, acquisition,
destruction, use, modification or disclosure.”63

Rhode Island
Identity Theft
Protection Act
of 2015

“A municipal agency, state agency or person that stores, collects, processes,
maintains, acquires, uses, owns or licenses personal information about a Rhode
Island resident shall implement and maintain a risk-based information security
program that contains reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate
to the size and scope of the organization; the nature of the information; and
the purpose for which the information was collected in order to protect the
personal information from unauthorized access, use, modification, destruction,
or disclosure and to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
such information.”64

Finally, consumer class action suits have relied on a variety of common law
bases.65 Theories include negligent misrepresentation, contractual duty,

60
61
62
63
64
65

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(2) (West/LexisNexis 2014).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14–3503 (2018).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10–1304 (2018).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.210(1) (2018).
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–49.3–2(a) (2015).
Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 34.
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equitable theories, and, of course, common law negligence.66 Each of these first
four theories faces procedural challenges that—although there may be isolated
situations in which a claim is viable—make them of little help to the bulk of
plaintiffs. Negligent misrepresentation claims, for example, require overt
representations by a defendant that they “would take reasonable measures to
protect the plaintiff’s information.”67 Even where a plaintiff can show such a
representation, defendants can escape these claims by demonstrating reliance on
the representation was not justified.68 Similarly, it has been difficult to establish
even implied contractual agreements to safeguard PII,69 particularly where the
parties do not share a direct relationship.70
In at least one case, a court has accepted equitable theories like unjust
enrichment as stating a claim for recovery of damages related to a data breach.
Among the theories surviving the motion to dismiss in In re Target Corp. Customer
Data Security Breach Litigation71 was the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment “would not
have shopped” theory.72 The Target court held that
[i]f Plaintiffs [could] establish that they shopped at Target after
Target knew or should have known of the breach, and that
Plaintiffs would not have shopped at Target had they known
about the breach, a reasonable jury could conclude that the
money Plaintiffs spent at Target is money to which Target “in
equity and good conscience” should not have received.73
The court did, however, reject the plaintiffs’ “overcharge” theory, reasoning
that the plaintiffs could not plausibly allege that they had been overcharged to

Id.
Id.
68 See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment Sys’s Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp.
2d 566, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim for
failure to prove reliance was reasonable), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Lone Star Nat.
Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys’s, Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013) (interpreting New
Jersey law and reversing and remanding on plaintiffs negligence claim).
69 See, e.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012) (alleging, inter alia,
a breach of a contract to provide healthcare by allowing unauthorized access to medical
information); In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d
108, 118 (D. Me. 2009) (alleging breach of a contract to protect customer’s debit card
information implied in a contract for the sale of goods), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011).
70 See, e.g., Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(pmb)(RLE), 2010
WL 2643307, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010).
71 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014).
72 Id. at 1178.
73 Id.
66
67
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offset the costs of data security since cash customers paid the same price and
faced no risk of PII theft.74
In recent years negligence has picked up speed as the theory of preference in
consumer class actions.75 Even so, there appears to be relatively little exploration
of the nature and source of the duty to safeguard. In some respects this is
unsurprising, and yet even when a plaintiff can meet his burden to show breach,
cause, and harm, the question of whether and why a defendant has the duty to
safeguard has proved to be surprisingly recalcitrant. There are a handful of
possible explanations for the absence of discussion on the basis for a duty to
safeguard.
First and foremost—these cases are relatively new, and they are not
inherently “high-dollar” claims.76 In terms of the development of the law, one
might conclude there simply has not been enough time for appellate courts to
hear and decide the issue.
Second, in many cases the question is simply not considered in great detail.
For example, in 2014 the District Court for Minnesota considered numerous
theories purporting to state a data breach claim, but, for the purposes of the
motion, Target did not dispute that Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the existence
of a duty to safeguard. Instead, the company chose to argue that the plaintiffs
had failed to allege any damages and that the negligence claims were barred by
the economic loss rule.77
Relatedly, and as Target illustrates, there are significant procedural hurdles to
recovery that garner more attention from courts and litigants. Most notably, data
breach plaintiffs have difficulty making adequate showings of standing and
harm.78 Courts have often held that data breach plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue because “no actual harm has occurred.”79 The typical reasoning in these
cases is that damages are not recoverable on the mere possibility of identity theft
because of the lack of proof of actual injury.80 Thus, arguments around standing
and harm are typically the focus of dispositive motions and orders, so that

Id.
David Zetoony et. al., 2017 Data Breach Litigation Report: A comprehensive analysis of class
action lawsuits involving data security breaches filed in United States District Courts, BRYAN CAVE
LEIGHTON PAISNER (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bryancave.com/images/content/9/6/v2/
96690/Bryan-Cave-Data-Breach-Litigation-Report-2017-edition.pdf
76 See John P. Hutchins & Renard C. Francois, A New Frontier: Litigation over Data Breaches,
20 No. 4 Prac. Litigator 47 (2009) (discussing the litigation landscape for data breaches).
77 In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn.
2014).
78 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 7.
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 496
(Me. 2010) (finding that time and effort, spent to avoid or remedy foreseeable harm was not
a cognizable injury for which damages could be recovered under the law of negligence).
74
75
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relatively little thought is given to why holders of PII have a responsibility to
safeguard it in the first place.
B. THE QUASI-BAILMENT THEORY

Interestingly, relatively few data-breach consumer plaintiffs have asserted
claims based on bailment theories.81 With only minor variations in language
across jurisdictions, the elements of a bailment are:
(1) delivery of personal property by one person to another to be
used for a specific purpose;
(2) acceptance of such delivery; and
(3) an express or implied contract that the purpose will be carried
out and the property will then be returned or dealt with as
otherwise directed.82
This definition of a bailment under Texas state law largely tracks the language
found in legal encyclopedias and practice manuals:
A bailment is a contractual relationship, express or implied,
which results from the delivery of personal property by one
person . . . and an acceptance of the property by another . . . for
the accomplishment of some purpose, beneficial to either the
bailor or bailee or both, on the condition that, once the purpose
has been fulfilled, the bailed property must either be redelivered
to the bailor, kept until he reclaims it, or otherwise dealt with
according to his directions.83
Naturally, there are potential roadblocks to the use of a bailment theory in
the data breach. First and foremost, it is not immediately clear that PII is the
type of “object,” if indeed it is an object, which might be the subject of a
bailment. Second, it is not obvious that “the shoe fits” for a bailment theory,
since bailments typically require return of the bailed object. Third, questions
might reasonably arise as to the very existence of an agreement, express or
81 See Zetoony, supra note 75 (charting the statistical breakdown of theories utilized by
plaintiffs’ attorneys in data breach litigation complaints, and showing that only 18% of
complaints include a bailment claim, compared to 95% including negligence claims)
82 Lynch Props. Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 1998).
83 Mark S. Dennison, Bailee’s Liability for Damage, Loss, or Theft of Bailed Property, 46 Am. Jur.
Proof of Facts 3d 361, § 2: Creation of Bailment Contract; Delivery and Acceptance (updated
Feb. 2018).
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implied, giving rise to the bailment. The data-breach case law evaluating the
bailment theory reflects these concerns.
Of the cases dealing with data breach litigation on a bailment theory, In re
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation84 appears to have
done so in the most detail. The court identified three failings in the bailment
theory. First, the plaintiffs alleged only that Sony failed to maintain reasonable
data security, and thus “there [were] no allegations of conversion or any other
intentional conduct by Sony that would indicate that Sony sought to unlawfully
retain possession of Plaintiffs’ Personal Information.”85 Second, the court
declared itself “hard pressed to conceive of how Plaintiffs’ Personal Information
could be construed to be personal property so that Plaintiffs somehow ‘delivered’
this property to Sony and then expected it be returned,” and that, in any event,
“if such a legal theory for bailment exists, Plaintiffs have failed to present the
Court with such in its Opposition papers.”86 Finally, the court found the
bailment claim duplicative of the claims for negligence and violation of California
consumer protection statutes, such that “any damages Plaintiffs might be able to
recover under this unorthodox claim for bailment would be recoverable under
its negligence and/or consumer protection claim.”87
Relying on Sony in part, the District Court for Minnesota found fault in the
consumer-plaintiffs’ bailment claim in Target because “[e]ven if Plaintiffs are
correct that intangible property such as their personal financial information can
constitute property subject to bailment principles, they [did] not—and [could
not]—allege that they and Target agreed that Target would return the property
to them.”88
Finally, the Court in Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co.89 considered the bailment issue
only in sufficient detail to note that “courts in Pennsylvania have yet to consider
whether such a claim could arise in connection with a loss of electronic
information,” and agreed with the logic of Sony, Target, and Ruiz, on the belief
that “Pennsylvania courts would do the same.”90
Thus, courts have found four types of problems with bailment theories in the
data breach context. First, reasonable questions might be raised about the
express or implied creation of the bailment relationship itself. Second, some
courts have expressed concern about whether PII is personal property for the
purposes of being delivered and returned in a bailment relationship. Third,
903 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
Id. at 974.
86 Id.; see also Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that
social security numbers and credit card information stolen from a computer were not property
for purposes of the law of bailment).
87 903 F. Supp. 2d at 974–75.
88 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1177.
89 136 F. Supp. 3d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
90 Id. at 679.
84
85
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courts have shown a recurring concern with holding a bailee liable for breach of
bailment when the damage is done by third-party criminal activity. Finally, courts
have expressed doubt about the bailment theory of data breach on the ground
that PII cannot be “returned” in the ordinary sense of bailed objects, and
therefore possession is not properly “temporary.” Part III will analyze these and
related issues involved in establishing a quasi-bailment theory giving rise to a duty
to take reasonable care to safeguard PII.
III. ANALYSIS
Courts should conceptualize data breach litigation under the framework of a
quasi-bailment theory.
A bailment is a contractual relationship, express or implied,
which results from the delivery [and acceptance] of personal
property. . . for the accomplishment of some purpose, beneficial
to either the bailor or bailee or both, on the condition that, once
the purpose has been fulfilled, the bailed property must either be
redelivered to the bailor, kept until he reclaims it, or otherwise
dealt with according to his directions.91
While negligence claims are the most common claim asserted in data breach
cases,92 this theory of data breach largely fails to explain why the duty exists. By
contrast, a bailment theory clearly explains why the duty exists, and thereby
informs its parameters and the relevant inquiries. In this context, an implied
bailment may be created via the delivery and acceptance of PII in a commercial
exchange for the purpose of facilitating the exchange, creating a mutually
beneficial relationship with the customarily implied condition that the PII will be
used for the purposes of the relationship and safeguarded against theft. While
the PII may not be “returned” as such, the bailee deals with it according to
implied instructions to use it as agreed, safeguard it, and subsequently store or
dispose of it by reasonable means.
A. INDIVIDUALS HAVE A PROPERTY INTEREST IN THEIR PII

It should be noted at the outset what this argument is not: the argument is not
that individuals own their personally identifiable information, at least not in any
sense that involves exclusivity and exclusion. What the argument is, is that
individuals have a property interest in the security of their PII. This is seen in
both the theoretical underpinnings of property law and the current state of the

91
92

Dennison, supra note 94.
Zetoony, supra note 75
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law today. On a theoretical basis, common law utilitarian principles and Lockean
theory support the assertion that individuals have an interest in their PII.
Further, the law presently contains numerous positive protections of PII,93 all of
which are consistent with an individual’s interests in their PII for the purposes
of a bailment.
1. Individuals clearly do not “own” their personally identifiable information.
This much is clear from case law addressing claims that ownership of PII gives
a person exclusionary rights to prevent information traders from dealing in PII
itself.94 Such claims advance ownership and interest theories aimed at
information privacy. Along these lines, “[p]ractically all federal and state laws that
address the issue of individual consent [to the collection of PII] apply the ‘optout’ rule” requiring companies to allow individuals the opportunity to opt out of
standard information practices, as opposed to the “opt-in” model, “which
obligates companies to obtain express consumer consent before they can share
or sell [customer PII].”95
However, American law dealing with PII is “‘a patchwork of uneven,
inconsistent, and often irrational’ federal and state rules.”96 Most such rules
protecting individuals from dissemination of their personal information apply
only to government entities,97 and the few federal regulations covering the
transfer of PII in the private market are industry- and even situation-specific.98
Importantly, “these regulations are not based on any uniform theory of rights.”99
Thus, as clear as it is that individuals do not own their PII, it is equally clear that

93 See, e.g., Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383–84 (1996) (“[P]ersonal information [is] any data about an
individual that is identifiable to that individual . . . . Such information, like all information, is
property.”).
94 See, e.g., Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting a
subscriber’s claim for unauthorized sale of subscriber lists); see also U.S. News & World Report,
Inc. v. Avhrami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *16–17 (Va. Cir. June 13, 1996)
(rejecting claims seeking to block unauthorized dissemination of PII based on a theory of
misappropriation of one’s name because individuals do not have property rights in the names
they use).
95 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 393.
96 See id. at 391 (quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 80 (1997)).
97 See id.; see, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (permitting individuals to
determine which personal records are collected, maintained, or disseminated by federal
agencies); see also Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–(2000) (providing
procedural requirements for sharing financial information among federal agencies).
98 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 391–92; see, e.g., Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.S. 1681 (2002) (recognizing the individual’s right to privacy
with regard to disclosure of credit records); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3401–3404 (2002) (recognizing individual’s right to privacy with regard to disclosure of
financial records by banks and governmental agencies).
99 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 392.
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the law does not foreclose the possibility that individuals may have a property
interest in the security of their PII.
An individual’s property interests in PII security should not be foreclosed by
these rules ,because the impetus behind most information privacy laws simply
does not carry over. Considering PII rights in reference to data security, it makes
sense to recognize greater property interests. In the privacy context, the notion
is that individuals have exclusionary rights to their PII, i.e., commercial entities may
not disseminate the information without that person’s consent.100 At its heart,
this is a pretty expansive claim. Exclusionary rights over who may “possess”
information like one’s name, home address, and date of birth would involve a
level of control over information far and above even the most liberal rights of
publicity. Claims to property interests in PII for security purposes, however, are
not nearly so expansive.
2. More to the point, utilitarian principles would seem to support the
assertion that individuals have an interest in the security of their sensitive PII.
“Under the utilitarian theory, rights should be allocated so as to maximize human
satisfaction or benefit.”101 In recent years, this has been interpreted to mean
economic efficiency and the facilitation of wealth-maximizing transactions.102
Unlike information privacy, it seems clear that the security of sensitive personal
information is the more efficient outcome.
By way of example, Judge Posner concluded in his article “The Right of
Privacy” that the efficient outcome in the privacy context is to assign the
property right to the seller of PII, rather than the individual.103 It is doubtful,
however, that his rationale translates to the security context. Judge Posner
reasoned that, for purposes of company’s commercial use of consumer
information, “the cost of obtaining the subscriber’s approval would be high
relative to the low value of the list.”104 Although there is some dispute on the
specifics of that claim,105 the logic itself appears to be sound. This same logic
does not apply, however, to PII in the security context. Simply put, lax data
security is almost certainly inefficient.

100 See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying
Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECHN. 91 (2009)
(examining the nature of data collection and dissemination).
101 Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 421, citing JEREMY BENTHAM,
1 SELECT EXTRACTS FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 33 (Thoemmes Press 1995)
(1843).
102 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36–39, 271–89 (4th ed. 1992);
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968).
103 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398 (1978).
104 Id.
105 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 421–22 (citing studies by
Kenneth C. Laudon indicating the inefficiency involved with telemarketers and junk-mail).
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Take the Equifax breach. On September 7, 2017, Equifax announced it had
suffered a massive breach that “compromised the personal information of as
many as 143 million Americans—almost half the [adult population of the]
country.”106 Examples of subsequent inefficiencies—be they temporal or
monetary—are legion. Equifax’s website and phone systems were apparently so
heavily bogged down in the days and weeks after the breach that it was extremely
difficult for affected persons to obtain information about the breach, determine
whether or not they were affected, and find out what to do next.107 Apparently,
Equifax’s responsiveness became so bad that people began to wonder if the
company was deliberately obfuscating attempts to obtain credit freezes. 108
Equifax representatives eventually told reporters that the company was
experiencing such a high volume of requests and communications that, on top
of everything else, Equifax was experiencing technical difficulties in
responding.109 Those customers that were able to get through to Equifax found
that many representatives had outdated information about the breach, if they had
any at all.110 This required Equifax to spend still more time and money training
its troubleshooting team.111
Even when customers were able to freeze their credit, many experienced
difficulties in obtaining the PIN number necessary to unfreeze their credit later
on.112 While Equifax maintained many of these issues were browser errors, the
fact remained that it became necessary to set up mechanisms to verify identities
by phone and generate new PINs, and even consider sending PINs via post mail
instead.113
It is axiomatic, on the other hand, that “[d]ata breaches are, at least to some
degree, preventable” and “[t]o the extent they are not preventable, their effects
can be mitigated by the way the company whose data is breached handles the
breach.”114 FTC guidelines are instructive on this point:
The Federal Trade Commission [has been] concerned with at least five
inadequate data security practices:115

O’Brien, supra note 1.
Ron Lieber, Equifax Finally Responds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2017, at B1.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Leahy, supra note 9, § 2 (citing Dave Maxfield & Bill Latham, Data Breaches, 25 S.C. LAW.
28, 30 (2014)).
115 Id. (citing Abraham Shaw, Note, Data Breach: From Notification to Prevention Using PCI DSS,
43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517, 558–59 (2010).
106
107
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1. Inadequately assessing system vulnerability to commonly
known or reasonably foreseeable attacks.
2. Failing to apply low-cost, simple, and readily available
defenses.
3. Using default user ID or passwords to protect sensitive data
rather than stronger passwords to prevent hackers.
4. Storing information in unencrypted files and sending sensitive
data via unencrypted transmission routes.
5. Failing to develop unauthorized access detection mechanisms.
While there is undoubtedly cost and time consumption associated with
correcting these practices, it appears to be generally true that they are achievable
within reason. The salient detail, therefore, is that “[i]f not prevented or
mitigated, data breaches can cause enormous harm and result in significant
financial damages.”116
On balance, therefore, negligent data security is inefficient, and utilitarian
principles counsel imposing a duty to safeguard.
3. More importantly still, the law confers or recognizes confidentiality rights
in PII in numerous and varied contexts. First, and most notably, HIPAA
imposes strict confidentiality requirements on the use of a person’s medical
information.117 Title II of HIPAA establishes policies and procedures for
maintaining the privacy of health related PII.118 The HIPAA Privacy Rule
regulates the use and disclosure of Protected Health Information held by
“covered entities,” including employer sponsored health plans, health insurers,
and medical service providers that engage in certain transactions.119 While
covered entities may disclose information for law enforcement purposes or to
facilitate treatment, payment, or health care operations, disclosures of Personal
Health Information generally require written authorization from the individual
for the disclosure.120
Similarly, under the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act (HITECH), the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) promoted and expanded the adoption of health

Id.
Id. § 3 n.6.
118 See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
August 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 1936.
119 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 160.103 (West 2018).
120 45 C.F.R. 164.502(a)(1)(iv).
116
117
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information technology.121 In relevant part, the HITECH Act requires entities
covered by the HIPAA to report data breaches which affect 500 or more persons
to HHS, the news media, and persons affected by the data breaches.122
Finally, the confidentiality interests established in HIPAA, the Code of
Federal Regulations, and HITECH also find analogues at the state level in the
many varieties of data-breach notification statutes mentioned above.123 Thus, in
these types of statutes, the law already recognizes the existence of confidentiality
and security interests in personally identifiable information. Based on these
examples, it is not a stretch to conclude that PII may be the type of property that
can be the object of a bailment.
B. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING PII MAY PLAUSIBLY INVOLVE A
BAILMENT AGREEMENT

While some courts have expressed concern about establishing the existence
of a bailment agreement,124 commercial transactions involving PII commonly
involve at least a plausible allegation of an implied bailment agreement. For one
thing, the public outcry routinely observable after a large-scale data breach
suggests that the general public understands the commercial holder to have a
duty of reasonable care. More importantly, however, courts have begun to
recognize that the realities of modern life imply a promise to safeguard PII.125
In Daly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., for example, the Supreme Court of New
York found that a purchaser of life insurance “was required to, and agreed to,
supply Met Life with highly sensitive personal information including her full
name, her Social Security number, and her date of birth,” concluding “[i]mplicit
in this agreement was a covenant to safeguard this information.”126 The court
explained:
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claims is that, in order to obtain a life
insurance policy, Ms. Daly had to provide sensitive personal
information for herself and for her father. Met Life represented
that this information would be protected and would remain fully

121 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final
Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/hitech-act-enforcementinterim-final-rule/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
122 42 U.S.C. § 17932(e) (2010).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 58–71.
124 See discussion supra Section II.B.
125 See 4 Misc. 3d 887, 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2004); see also Jones v. Commerce Bancorp, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32067 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006).
126 4 Misc. 3d 887, 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2004).
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confidential. Relying on that promise, Ms. Daly released her
personal information.127
This summary explains the paradox of refusing to recognize a duty to
safeguard under the quasi-bailment theory: people engage in numerous PIIdependent transactions every day, many of them realistically less optional than
the decision to purchase life insurance, which require them to trust another
person with their PII. Common experience would seem to reflect that consumers
and commercial entities understand there to be an implied covenant to keep the
data secure.
Thus, the Daly court noted, “[p]laintiffs’ claims are similar to those seen in
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality.”128 The court
further explained that, within the doctor-patient relationship, this duty comes
“not . . . from a statutory right . . . [but] from ‘the implied covenant of trust and
confidence that is inherent in the physician patient relationship. . . .’”129 And,
indeed, “[a] similar covenant of trust and confidence may be inferred in business
dealings.”130 The court concluded that “this concept has never before been
applied to issues surrounding the protection of confidential personal
information, [but] perhaps in the absence of appropriate legislative action, it
should.”131
It should. Both customers and businesses undoubtedly recognize the gravity
of a data breach and the harm that flows from it. And it is entirely plausible that,
in light of this reality, under some circumstances this understanding takes the
next step into being an implied promise to keep and use PII safely, within reason.
The substance of the agreement, moreover, need not be excruciatingly
explicit to be discernible. On its own terms, a bailment for mutual benefit
requires only that the bailee exercise reasonable care in safeguarding the object
of the bailment.132 While “reasonable” data security is undoubtedly a fact
specific question, there are certainly reasonable starting points available in the
data-breach literature:
Security failures resulting in loss of data include:
(a)Failing to establish or enforce rules sufficient to make user
credentials hard to guess. For example, customers may be
allowed to use the same word, including common dictionary

127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 892.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Dennison, supra note 83, §§ 4–5.
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words, as both the password and user ID, or a close variant of
the user ID as the password.
(b)Permitting the sharing of user credentials among a customer’s
multiple users, thus reducing likely detection of, and
accountability for, unauthorized data searches.
(c)Failing to require periodic changes of user credentials, such as
every 90 days, for customers with access to sensitive, nonpublic
information.
(d)Failing to suspend user credentials after a certain number of
unsuccessful log-in attempts.
(e)Allowing customers to store their user credentials in a
vulnerable format in cookies on their computers.
(f) Failing to require customers to encrypt or otherwise protect
credentials, search queries, and/or search results in transit
between customer computers and Web sites.
(g)Allowing customers to create new credentials without
confirming that the new credentials were created by the
customers rather than identity thieves.
(h)Failing to adequately assess the vulnerability of the web
application and computer network for commonly known or
reasonably foreseeable attacks.
(i)Failing to implement simple, low-cost, and readily available
defenses to these attacks.133
The virtue of this approach is threefold. First, the analysis lends itself to
flexible application to the varying size of PII holders, the amount of information
they store, and even the range of PII involved in their business. Second, while a
“reasonable care” standard does not provide quantifiable clarity in data security
standards, it imposes a framework that is familiar to corporate litigants,
conducive to presenting defenses to liability in court, and will foster consistency
across jurisdictions. Finally, a duty to safeguard based on a bailment theory does
not automatically equate the possession of another’s PII with the duty to

133 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 2 (citing NIMMER & TOWLE, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS § 16.06(1)(B)).
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safeguard it; instead, it offers a workable framework for rendering consistent
decisions on when the duty exists and how far it goes. In this sense, the bailment
theory is a preferable alternative to other proposed regimes.134
C. PROTECTING PII AGAINST THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL ACCESS FALLS WITHIN
THE SCOPE OF THE IMPLIED BAILMENT AGREEMENT

Fundamentally, the duty of care under a bailment theory includes
“safeguarding the bailor’s property . . . for any damage, loss or theft proximately
caused by his lack of reasonable care.135 There is no particular reason this should
not apply to data breach litigation, and numerous reasons it should.
To begin with, the analogy plays. It is universally true in bailment law that
the nature of “reasonable” care requires analysis on a case-by-case basis.136 This
is no less true in data breach than with regard to tangible objects. In the bailment
of tangible objects, a good example might be the theft of a bailed vehicle from a
bailee’s parking lot. In that case, relevant considerations include factors like
whether there were enough parking lot attendants on duty or whether it was
reasonable to leave the vehicle unlocked with the keys inside.137
It is not difficult to analogize the parking lot to a server, nor PII to the cars.
Granted, the functionality of the exchange is not a perfect match—but it doesn’t
have to be. The purpose of the analogy is to show that data security may also be
unreasonable if it lacks “enough parking lot attendants,” i.e., “inadequately
assess[es] system vulnerability to . . . reasonably foreseeable attacks,” or “fail[s]
to apply low-cost, simple, and readily available defenses,”138 or else “leaves the
keys in an unlocked car,” i.e., “stor[es] information in unencrypted files,” or
“fail[s] to develop unauthorized access detection mechanisms.”139
In the context of these commercial relationships built on PII, the very nature
of an implied bailment agreement is that an individual gives over control of their
information (or at least that compilation of it) to a commercial entity in order to
obtain services with the understanding that it will be used for that purpose and

134 Contra John A. Fisher, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for The Negligent
Enablement of Data Breach, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215 (2013).
135 See Dennison, supra note 83, § 11.
136 See id.
137 Id. (citing Allright Parking System, Inc. v. Deniger, 508 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.
Eastland 1974) (“[F]inding that bailee did not exercise reasonable care to protect bailor’s car
against theft because parking lot was not attended by an adequate and prudent number of
employees.”); Schulze v. Allison, 204 Okla. 147, 227 P.2d 658 (1950) (“[F]inding that bailee
failed to use reasonable care to protect bailed vehicle from theft where single attendant on
duty was required to park and deliver cars of customers from connecting parking lots and left
keys in ignition.”).
138 Leahy, supra note 9, § 2.
139 Id.
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protected against others. The implied bailment agreement itself centers around
the protection of PII against unauthorized access.
D. WHILE A BAILEE CANNOT “RETURN” PII IN THE ORDINARY SENSE, THE
BAILEE RETAINS OR DISPOSES OF THE PII ACCORDING TO CONDITIONS OF
THE BAILMENT IMPLIED IN CUSTOM

Admittedly, a bailee cannot “return” PII in the customary sense of presenting
the bailor with the object and relinquishing its control to the bailor. However,
this cannot defeat a quasi-bailment of PII because, as noted above, a bailee must
either return the bailed property to the bailor, or dispose of it according to his
instructions.140
It is worth reiterating that the principle concern of returning a bailed object
to the bailor is not any rigid or formalistic concern for technicality, but rather
clearly demonstrating that the object in question is bailed—rather than given. The
guiding principle in a quasi-bailment, therefore, should be some similar
requirement that the original conveyance does not pass title nor surrender the
property. This is clearly met in the PII context.
Firstly, conveyance of PII to the bailee clearly does not sever the bailor’s
interest, because in every instance the bailor’s confidentiality interest in the PII
remains unchanged. The bailor has in no sense passed title or otherwise
relinquished his interest in his personally identifiable information. Any such
suggestion would be absurd—notice statutes, confidentiality requirements, and
the broader world of privacy and nondisclosure operate where a person or entity
holds another person’s PII.
Similarly, the nature of the transaction is such that the bailee has clear,
although implied, instructions as to how to handle PII. Namely, it is reasonable
to say that customary usage of PII establishes the parties’ shared expectation that,
during the course of the relationship, the bailee is to use the information for the
agreed purpose, reasonably protect it against unauthorized access, and return it
thereafter or dispose of it according to customary practice. In this sense, the
implied instructions as to the PII may be thought of in one of two ways: an
indefinite bailment or a bailment ending upon safe disposal.
In the first alternative, the bailment may simply be thought of as lasting for
an indefinite term. While the concept is admittedly somewhat novel, it makes
sense in the PII context in a way it simply could not with tangible objects. A
tangible object must be returned within some definable length of time, or for all
intents and purposes it effectively becomes the property of the bailee. Not so
with PII. No matter how long a data collector, retailer, or healthcare provider
stores PII, it never becomes any less personal to the bailor, and his interest in it
does not diminish until his death. Further, because the bailee must also store
140

See Dennison, supra note 83.
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and protect the information of present customers, it might not unreasonably
heighten the burden of the bailee to be held to his agreement.
Conversely, the bailment may also be terminated upon the safe disposal of
the information. In the paper era of information storage, at some point it became
necessary to physically dispose of older records no longer in use. While storage
capacities for digital information exponentially exceed the capabilities of paper
storage, companies may choose to dispose of non-current records for any
number of reasons. Once a bailee safely wipes the information from his digital
records, he is absolved of any duty to safeguard that particular manifestation of
PII. And again, disposal of the information instead of per se “return” does
nothing to diminish the bailor’s interests in or value derived from PII, so the
purposes of temporary conveyance are served.
Thus, plaintiffs in data breach cases might plausibly state a claim for negligent
data security under a quasi-bailment theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
If recent experience has taught us anything, it is that data breach concerns are
likely to become more pressing, not less. The patchwork legal framework for
imposing varying duties under varying circumstances across state lines not only
deprives plaintiffs of a remedy, but imposes complicated compliance regimes for
commercial PII holders.
At bottom, the thrust of this Note is this: quasi-bailment theories imposing a
duty to safeguard PII may state a claim sufficient to surpass a motion to dismiss.
Undoubtedly, the circumstances of a given case may prevent a claim from
reaching the requisite plausibility—and the facts of many cases will certainly
make it difficult to survive summary judgement—but modern usage of PII and
common law bailment principles lead one to conclude that commercial holders
of PII may have a duty of reasonable care to protect that information against
third-party criminal theft.
At a broad level, this is a problem for the courts, not the legislature. Despite
the modernity of the problem, the solution is better vested in a system that
adjudicates on a case-by-case basis and can therefore evaluate each case based
on security standards that are reasonable at the time. This is because in one
sense, the data breach problem is more like an arms race than a bank robbery: a
legislature may simply make theft illegal, but the nature of data theft and security
is that methods and techniques are constantly evolving in response to one
another, at a pace which neither the legislature nor an administrative agency can
hope to match.
Moreover, this is simply not a field where “one size fits all” security standards
fairly asses when security is reasonable or not. Firms collecting PII have varying
levels of resources, store varying amounts and types of PII, and face different
levels of threats. Thus, what administrative agencies like the FTC might do
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instead, for example, is study common data security practices that will help courts
establish guidelines within which changing practices and technologies may fit.
Therefore, it is far better that we instruct commercial holders of PII to
exercise reasonable care when their possession of PII stems from a quasibailment, and allow them to defend themselves on those terms if a breach occurs.
Admittedly, this does not totally resolve the uncertainty that businesses face.
What it does do, however, is bring uniformity and familiarity to how questions of
negligent security will be addressed, while still allowing for the necessary
flexibility in what those questions will be. From the perspective of consumer
class actions, this is a marked improvement.
Indeed, the alternative seems to be a rigid statutory framework that inevitably
fails, to the extent it tries, to mandate data security standards that are not one size
fits all. Under the proposals in this Note, the holder can present evidence
rebutting the presumption of such an agreement, assert procedural defenses like
standing and harm, and, of course, argue that their security measures were
reasonable.
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